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Abstract
This dissertation is a collection of theoretical and empirical essays on oil price
fluctuations, macroeconomics, and credit risks in banking systems. The disserta-
tion consists of three papers organized as chapters: i) Chapter 1 evaluates the opti-
mal monetary policy response to the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations under
a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) framework for small open oil-
importing economies, ii) Chapter 2 examines the empirical dynamic effects of under-
lying shocks of oil price fluctuations on monetary policy response and macroeconomic
aggregates across oil-exporting and oil-importing open economies, and iii) Chapter 3,
however, examines the effect of the recent oil price slumps on credit risks and banking
instability across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Chapter 3 further examines
the macro-financial linkages between the real economy and GCC banking systems.
Chapter 1 constructs a DSGE model for small open oil-importing economies to
evaluate the optimal monetary policy response to the underlying causes of oil price
fluctuations and its transmission channels to these economies. This chapter incorpo-
rates oil supply disruption shock, oil demand shock driven by world economic activi-
ties, and oil speculative demand shock. The model incorporates oil and non-oil goods
in consumption and final good production, oil storage with competitive oil-speculative
firms, exogenously determined oil supply, and endogenously determined real oil price.
The model explores whether the origin of oil price shocks requires a different optimal
monetary policy response with a central bank committed to stabilizing output-gap and
inflation. The results demonstrate that central banks in small open economies should
indeed identify these underlying causes of oil price fluctuations and respond to the ori-
iii
gin of the oil shock. Therefore, an oil price hike (or slump) caused by world economic
activities induces a tightening (or expansionary) optimal monetary policy response.
An oil price hike (or slump), however, caused by oil supply disruption and specu-
lative oil demand shocks induces an expansionary (or tightening) optimal monetary
policy response. The oil price hike induced by oil supply disruption and speculative
oil demand shocks brings unwanted economic consequences to small open economies
and therefore a monetary policy with stabilizing objectives will have to accommodate
these shocks.
Chapter 2 further constructs a Structural VAR model that jointly captures the in-
teractions between macroeconomic aggregates, monetary policy and the underlying
causes of oil price fluctuations. The structural model of Chapter 2 follows Kilian
(2009) in identifying the underlying the oil price shocks and Kim and Roubini (2000)
in identifying the monetary policy in open economies. The results indicate that the oil
supply disruption shock tends to have a diminished effect across oil-importing open
economies. The oil demand shock driven by world economic activity, however, tends
to stimulate domestic economic activities across oil exporting and oil importing open
economies. Both world oil demand and oil-specific demand shocks place an infla-
tionary pressure on domestic CPI across these economies. The results report asym-
metric interest rate responses to different oil shocks within and across these open
economies. In Mexico, Norway, Japan, Thailand, and Denmark; the interest rate
falls in response to oil supply disruption shock. The interest rate rises in response
to world oil demand shock across oil importing economies. The monetary policies,
however, responded differently to oil-specific demand shock. The interest rate rises
in oil-importing economies such as Japan, the U.K., Thailand, Denmark, and Sweden
and falls in oil-exporting economies such as Canada, Norway, and Mexico.
Chapter 3 assesses the effect of the recent 2014-2015 oil price slumps on the fi-
nancial stability in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. The first objective
iv
of Chapter 3 is to assess the oil price shock transmission channels, along with other
macroeconomic shocks, to GCC banks’ balance sheets. This part of Chapter 3 imple-
ments a System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) model of Blundell & Bond
(1998) and a Panel Fixed Effect Model to estimate the response of nonperforming
loans (NPLs) to its macroeconomic determinants. The second objective of Chapter
3 is to assess any negative feedback effects between the GCC banking systems and
the real economy. The second part of Chapter 3 implements a Panel VAR model
to explore the macro-financial linkages between GCC banking systems and the real
economy. The results indicate that oil price, non-oil GDP, interest rate, stock prices,
and housing prices are major determinants of NPLs across GCC banks and therefore
are major determinants of financial stability in the region. Credit risk shock tends to
propagate disturbance to non-oil GDP, credit growth, and stock prices across GCC
economies. A higher level of NPLs restricts banks’ credit growth and can dampen
economic growth in these economies. The results support the notion that disturbances
in banking systems lead to unwanted economic consequences in the real sector. For
policy makers with financial stability objectives, counter cyclical policies to fluctua-
tions in international oil prices are needed to limit the GDP slowdown and smooth the
potential spillover effects to banking systems. The GCC economies, however, accu-
mulated large amount of oil stabilization buffers and have the fiscal space to limit any
negative feedback to their financial sectors.
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Chapter 1
The Optimal Monetary Policy Response to
the Underlying Causes of Oil Price




The assumption of oil price exogeneity in macroeconomic models was the common approach
in studying the dynamic of oil price fluctuations (see Kilian (2009)). Historically, the assumption
of oil price exogeneity was largely justified by the dominant role of the supply side in interna-
tional oil markets. In the 70s, the conflict in the Middle East, the rise of OPEC, and the Iranian
Revolution were the main causes of oil price fluctuations. As a result, the literature ignored the
underlying causes of oil price fluctuations and focused exclusively on the dynamic of an exoge-
nous oil price assumption [see Hamilton (1983), Bernanke et al. (1997), Hamilton (2003)), and
Blanchard & Gali (2007)]. The oil price hike in 2008-2009 and its recent slump in 2014-2015
bring various economic consequences to small open economies. The 2008-2009 oil price hike
was caused by the demand side of international oil markets and mainly driven by strong economic
growth in emerging markets. The recent 2014-2015 slumps of oil prices, however, are driven by a
combined effect of slow economic growth in emerging markets and a massive increase in global
oil production. This chapter highlights how does an oil price increase (or decrease) caused by dis-
ruptions in global oil production, world economic growth, or oil speculative demand shocks affect
the small open economies and what are the optimal policy responses to these underlying causes
of oil price fluctuations. Kilian (2009) argues that the existing macroeconomic models must con-
sider the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations and rejects the common assumption of oil price
exogeneity. The main theoretical premise behind this chapter is to examine the transmission chan-
nels of these underlying causes of oil price fluctuations on small open economies and whether the
origin of the oil price shocks should determine the optimal monetary policy response. Chapter 1
constructs a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for small open economies
to evaluate the optimal monetary policy response to the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations
and its transmission channels to these economies. This chapter incorporates oil supply disruption
shock, oil demand shock driven by world economic activities, and oil speculative demand shock.
The model explores whether the origin of oil price shocks requires a different optimal monetary
policy response with a central bank committed to stabilizing output-gap and inflation. The results
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of this chapter show that central banks in small open economies should indeed identify these un-
derlying causes of oil price fluctuations and respond to the origin of the oil price shock. Further,
evidence for asymmetric monetary policy responses to different shocks of oil price fluctuations are
discussed in Chapter 2. Hence, Chapter 2 complements the theoretical work of Chapter 1.
1.2 Literature Review
Economists disagree on the reasons behind the diminished effect of 2000s oil price shocks on
macroeconomic aggregates, specifically inflation and output. Blanchard & Gali (2007) argue that
the diminishing effect of the 2000s oil shocks is due to i) the decline in real wage rigidities ii)
the higher credibility of monetary policies, and iii) the decline of oil share in productions. Kilian
(2009) identifies, however, the underlying shocks of oil price fluctuations in international oil mar-
kets. He further argues that the effect of oil price shocks depends on these underlying causes of oil
price fluctuations.
Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Kilian (2012) are the first to examine appropriate monetary policy
response to different oil shocks. From a welfare-maximizing perspective, Bodenstein, Guerrieri,
and Kilian (2012) conclude optimal responses to oil shocks are asymmetric and note “ no two
structural shocks induce the same monetary policy response.” Thus, for the U.S. Federal Reserve,
they argue that the origin of the oil shocks should determine the policy response.
Plante (2009) calibrates a New Keynesian DSGE model for the U.S. and examines the op-
timal response of monetary policy to exogenous oil supply shock and productivity-driven demand
shock. Under different policy rules, Plante (2009) finds that the nominal interest rate falls after
an oil supply shock and rises after a productivity-driven demand shock. Plante (2009) finds that
the optimal monetary policy response to exogenous oil supply shock and productivity-driven de-
mand shock are asymmetric. In line with Bodenstein, Guerrieri, and Kilian (2012), Plante (2009)
confirms that different oil shocks induce different optimal monetary policy responses.
Kilian (2009) structurally decomposes the oil price into i) oil supply disruption shocks, ii)
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oil demand shock driven by world economic activities, and iii) oil-specific demand shock driven by
precautionary demand for oil. Kilian & Lewis (2011) find the Federal Funds rate rises in response
to an oil price hike driven by world economic activities and oil specific-demand shocks. However,
the Federal Funds rate falls in response to oil supply disruption shock. Chapter 2 provides a
literature review on the empirical results of oil price shocks.
Bernanke et al. (1997) show that the endogenous tightening response of monetary policy to
oil price hikes in the 1970s accounts for a large part of the “recessionary impact of oil price” on
macroeconomic aggregates. The paper argues that the U.S. Federal Reserve could have avoided
that recession by keeping interest rate constant and hence tolerated a higher inflation rate.
Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2011) introduce a two-country DSGE model that endoge-
nously determines oil price with an incomplete financial market and calibrated the model for the
U.S. economy. They report oil price shock leads to a reduction in U.S. non-oil consumption and
an immediate depreciation effect on real exchange rate. Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2011)
further indicate that oil shocks are significant in explaining the fluctuation of non-oil trade balance,
which “reflects a strong interaction between oil imports and non-oil imports.”
Under alternative monetary policy rules with a welfare-maximizing model, Bodenstein et al.
(2008) explore the optimal response to an energy supply shock. The key result of their analysis is
that the adverse energy supply shock leads to a persistent increase in core and headline inflation.
The results further show that macroeconomic implications of a central bank responding to a fore-
cast of core inflation are different than those implications due to responding to headline inflation.
The results of Bodenstein et al. (2008) suggest that responding to a forecast of core inflation leads
to a more stabilized economy.
Başkaya et al. (2013) examine the uncertainty of oil prices and its implications under small
open DSGE framework. With oil price modeled as an exogenous variable, Başkaya et al. (2013)
find two channels through which oil price affects small open economies: i) leads to a riskier
marginal product of capital and more incentives to use less capital, and ii) leads to a higher level of
demand for precautionary savings. Medina & Soto (2005) calibrate a small open DSGE model for
4
the Chilean economy. The study finds that an increase of 13% in real oil price causes an increase
in inflation and a decrease in GDP.
Unalmis et al. (2012) build on recent literature of commodity storage modeling to introduce
speculative oil demand in a DSGE framework. The speculative oil firms enable the model to link
the current oil price, future oil price, and oil inventory. Unalmis et al. (2012) indicate that the
asymmetric effect of oil price increase is due to the endogenous monetary policy response.
Peersman & Stevens (2010) develop a structural DSGE model for the U.S. and a simplified
oil producing economy. They claim that different oil shocks have different macroeconomic effects
on the U.S. economy. The oil supply shock, their results indicate, explains more than 50% of the
fluctuations of real oil price. As a result, the real oil price is exogenous to the U.S. macroeconomic
aggregates. Peersman & Stevens (2010) argue that the significant role of oil supply shock in their
results is due to the shift in power from oil producing economies to oil companies. The oil-specific
demand shocks come second in explaining the fluctuations in the real price of oil.
1.3 Model
The model presented in this chapter extends the new Keynesian small open economy model of
Kollmann (2002) and Kollmann (2001). The model incorporates oil and non-oil goods in consump-
tion, oil and non-oil goods in final good production, oil storage with competitive oil-speculative
firms, exogenously determined oil supply, and endogenously determined real oil price. The ob-
jective of the central bank is to stabilize output-gap and inflation. The household representative
maximizes expected utility by choosing oil-consumption (Cot ), non-oil consumption (C
n
t ), capi-
tal (Kt), hours worked (Lt), and domestic bonds (At), and buying an international foreign bond
(Bt). Under a monopolistic competition, the model takes nominal rigidity in pricing imported
and domestic intermediate non-oil goods. The domestic economy exports non-oil intermediate
goods, imports foreign intermediate non-oil goods, and imports crude oil. The real price of oil is
endogenously determined as a result of oil market clearing.
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1.3.1 Household
The household’s budget constraint for period t is:










Incomplete market frictions in investment are integrated to account for adjustment costs in
investment. The investment is specified as follows:
It = Kt+1 +ψ(Kt+1,Kt)− (1−δ )Kt (1.2)







Kt and it is the interest rate on
domestic currency bonds At . i
f
t is the interest rate on foreign currency bonds Bt . Schmitt-Grohé &
Uribe (2003) and Mendoza (1991) found open economy models in absence of adjustment costs in





β tut (Ct ,Lt) (1.3)

























Following Bodenstein, Erceg, and Guerrieri (2011), the consumption basket (Ct) in household’s
budget constraint is produced by consumption distributors under perfect competition. The house-
hold representative maximizes the lifetime expected utility by choosing oil-consumption (Cot ),
non-oil consumption (Cnt ), capital (Kt), hours worked (Lt), domestic bonds (At), and buying an
international foreign bond (Bt). γ is the elasticity of substitution between oil and non-oil consump-
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tion. χ is the inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of consumption. η is the inverse of
Frisch wage elasticity of labor supply.







that maximize the expected lifetime utility function. The following equations are the first order




































































































The above equations are Euler conditions. (Πt) is the domestic inflation, RERt is the real
exchange rate, and (Π∗t ) is the world inflation rate, which is exogenous. (ϒt) is a stationary exoge-
nous variable referred to as “UIP shock” as in Kollmann (2002) to account for uncovered interest
parity (UIP) .
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1.3.2 Final Good Production
Under a perfectly competitive market, the final good producer takes the final non-oil good (Znt )
and crude oil (Y ot ), and converts them into a final good (Zt). (Y
o
t ) is imported from the rest of the
world, and appears in the current account1. The final good is either consumed by households or
invested in the economy.
Zt =Ct + It (1.12)
The final good production utilizes the following CES technology where 0 < ω j < 1, j = o,m



































In the non-oil sector, under a perfectly competitive market, the final non-oil good producer
takes a continuum of non-oil domestic intermediate goods and non-oil foreign intermediate goods




























1See the Appendix for the detailed model setup
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The first order conditions for the cost minimization problems for the final good producer and

























1.3.3 Intermediate Goods Sector
The following technology is utilized to produce domestic goods and is specified as:
Y ( j)t = XtK( j)
αL( j)1−αt ,0 < α < 1 (1.21)







































The domestic non-oil goods are either exported or domestically consumed in the final good
production.
Y ( j)t =Y ( j)
d
t +Y ( j)
x
t (1.25)
Note that Y it = (
´ 1
0




θ with θ > 1 and for i = d,m, where Y dt ( j) and Y
m
t ( j) are
quantity indices of domestic and imported intermediate non-oil goods. θ is a constant elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods. Respectively, the price for domestic and imported

















Given the the domestic output price Pd,t and the domestic intermediate good price Pd,t( j),
competitive firm chooses Y dt ( j) that maximizes the following profit:









t ( j)d j
]
s.t.
Y dt = (
ˆ 1
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The solution yields the demand function of the domestic intermediate producer
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and similarly yields the demand function of the intermediate good importer
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The demand function for domestic exports is a function of real exchange rate and relative
domestic price which is specified as follows:






ξ reflects the price demand-elasticity for domestic goods by foreigners and Y ∗t reflects the
exogenous foreign demand caused by a shock to world real economic activities.
1.3.3.1 Intermediate Domestic Goods Firms
Under monopolistic competition, the market consists of a continuum of intermediate non-oil
goods firms indexed by j belong to [0,1]. The firms take capital K(j) and labor L(j) to produce
differentiated intermediate non-oil goods Y(j). Following Calvo (1983), the intermediate domes-
tic firm is allowed to adjust its price with probability (1−φ) and the price remains unchanged
with constant probability φ . The intermediate domestic non-oil goods producer maximizes the





Y dt ( j)
Note that the the stochastic process discount factor is β τλt+τ and λt+τ is the marginal utility of
consumption in period t+τ . The problem, then, can be written as a maximization of the discounted














































, which is independent of τ























1.3.3.2 Intermediate Imported goods Firms
Under monopolistic competition, the market consists of a continuum of intermediate non-oil
goods importers indexed by j belong to [0,1]. The firm j imports at the world international price to
produce a differentiated imported good Yt,m( j). The intermediate importer is allowed to adjust its
price with probability (1−φ). Its price remains unchanged with constant probability φ .




























The price that the intermediate importer chooses is (P( j)m,t), which is independent of τ and
























1.3.4 Oil Storage Firms
There is a continuum of competitive oil storers or speculators indexed by m belong to [0,1] with
no barriers to enter to the oil storage market2. At time t, the representative oil speculator buys (Dt)
with oil spot price (Pot ) and store that amount. At time t+1, the representative oil speculator sells




to make profits (Πot ) from the oil price difference between time t
and t+1. Hence, the representative oil speculator influences the demand on oil by storing at time t


























(1+ ς +ϕDtSdt) (1.31)
As in Unalmis et al. (2012), the model in this chapter includes an oil storage market with
competitive oil-speculative firms. This chapter further includes a shock to the demand of these oil
speculative firms that mimics the speculative oil demand shock. ς +ϕDtSdt reflects storing cost
of one unit of oil with Sdt represents a shock to speculative demand in oil storage market. ς < 0 is
“convenience yield” and ϕ an increasing cost of storing one more unit of oil. 1−a is the “waste”
due to storing oil, and this waste is assumed to be 1%.
2In this part, I follow Unalmis, Unalmis, and Unsal (2012) in modeling the oil speculators which was recently
developed based on commodity storage literature.
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1.3.5 Market Clearing Conditions
The market cleating conditions for the model are:









The supplies of Lt ,and Kt are equal to the demands of intermediate producers. The rate at
which the domestic household borrows in international bond market is equal to exogenous world
interest rate plus a “spread”(see Kollmann (2001, 2002)).













ζ > 0 is the degree of capital mobility. With ζ = 0, the country has a perfect capital mobility.
In this chapter, oil supply is exogenously determined, real oil price is endogenously determined,
and the oil market clearing condition is:
















t are international interest rate, international price inflation, world oil
consumption, world oil supply, speculative demand shock, productivity shock, UIP shock, and







































Y ∗t = (1−ρ






































1.3.7 The Central Bank
it = i+Λπ π̂t +ΛY Ŷt +ΛRER ˆRERt (1.34)
The central bank implements short-term nominal interest rate, it , as its monetary policy
instrument. The policy coefficients, [Λπ ,ΛY ,ΛRER], determine the response of the central bank to
steady-state deviations of output, inflation, and real exchange rate.
1.3.8 The Objective of the Central Bank:








λY and λi are the relative weight on output-gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing. The







β jLFt+ j (1.36)
The central bank is committed to setting [Λπ ,ΛY ,ΛRER] at the values that minimize its ex-







. This chapter aims to find the optimal pol-
icy coefficients in order to analyze the optimal policy responses to the underlying causes of oil
price fluctuations. First, this chapter derives an analytical country-specific steady-state solution.
Second, it implements a central bank objective function to loop the entire model and find the val-




jLFt+ j. The loss function includes the variance of ∆it = it − it−1 to account for any high
variation in interest rate.
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1.3.9 Calibration
The parameters of this model are mostly borrowed from Kollmann (2002). The discount factor
(β ) is set to 0.99 and the capital depreciation rate is set to δ = 0.025. The price elasticities of the
aggregate imports and exports are set to (ν = 0.6,ξ = 0.8). The steady-state price-marginal cost
markup factor for intermediate goods set to
(θ )
(1−θ ) = 1.2. The capital adjustment cost parameter is
set to ψ = 15. The capital mobility parameter is set to ζ = 0.0019. The parameter of Calvo price
setting is set to φ = 0.75. The the inverse elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of consumption
is set to χ = 2. The the inverse of Frisch wage elasticity of labour supply is set to η = 1.5. The
elasticity of substitution in consumption basket is set to γ = 0.3. λY = 1.5 and λi = 0.5 are the
relative weight on output-gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing. The parameters of the
exogenous shocks are set to σ i
∗
t = 0.004 with ρ
i∗ = 0.75, σ Xt = 0.01 with ρ





= 0.8, σ ϒt = 0.033 with ρ
ϒ = 0.5, σ O
S
t = 0.01 with ρ
OS = 0.9, σY
∗
t = 0.01 with ρ
Y ∗ =
0.95, and ,σ Sdt = 0.01 with ρ
Sd = 0.98.
1.4 Results
Under a calibrated small open DSGE model, the optimal policy coefficients are ΛY = 1.4030,
Λπ = 0.0147, and ΛRER = 1.9896 with an the objective function of a central bank that minimizes
the fluctuations in output gap and inflation. The results are robust with different relative weights
on output-gap stabilization and interest rate smoothing. The results demonstrate the policy makers
in small open economies should indeed respond to the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations
and not to changes in oil price itself.
Figures 1.1-1.15 show the impulse responses of policy interest rate and several macroeconomic
variables within the model to the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations. The model incorpo-
rates structural shocks in oil supply disruption, oil demand driven by world economic activities,
and speculative oil demand. The macroeconomic variables under consideration are policy interest
rate, domestic output, domestic exports, domestic consumption, domestic investment, domestic
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inflation, real exchange rate, oil consumption, domestic wages, and real oil price.
Under small open economy framework with a central bank committed to stabilizing output-
gap and inflation, Figures 1.1, 1.6, and 1.11 reveal the optimal policy responses to structural oil
price shocks. The results demonstrate that the optimal monetary policy response to an oil price
fluctuation caused by structural world oil demand shock differs from the optimal policy response
to structural oil supply disruption and speculative oil demand shocks.
An oil price hike (or slump) driven by world economic activities tends to stimulate (or dampen)
the demand on domestic exports and domestic oil demand for production. The oil price hike caused
by this shock leads to a higher level of domestic wages and increases the domestic inflation. As a
result of this oil price shock, the domestic consumption, domestic output, and domestic investment
increase as do the domestic oil consumption (see Figures 1.7-1.10 ). The optimal policy response,
therefore, to an oil price hike (or slump) caused by world economic activities requires a tighten-
ing (or expansionary) monetary policy response with an the objective function of a central bank
committed to stabilizing output-gap and inflation.
An oil price hike (or slump), however, caused by oil supply disruption and oil speculative
demand shocks tends to dampen (or stimulate ) domestic consumption, domestic output, and do-
mestic investment in small open economies (see Figures ). This oil price hike caused by those
shocks leads to lower oil demand in production, lower domestic wages, and lower domestic infla-
tion as well. As a result of this shock, the domestic oil consumption and oil in production decrease.
The optimal policy response, therefore, to an oil price hike (or slump) due to oil supply disruption
and oil speculative demand induces an expansionary (or tightening) monetary response to smooth
its negative economic consequences on small open economies with a central bank committed to
stabilizing output-gap and inflation.
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1.5 Conclusion
Chapter 1 constructs a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model for small open
economies to evaluate the optimal monetary policy response to the underlying causes of oil price
fluctuations and its transmission channels to these economies. This chapter incorporates the un-
derlying causes of oil price fluctuations including oil supply disruption, oil demand driven by
world economic activities, and speculative oil demand. The results of Chapter 1 demonstrate that
the origin of the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations induces different monetary policy re-
sponse. The results find that the origin of oil price shocks have different economic consequences
on small open economies and policy makers with stabilization objectives should indeed identify
and respond to the causes of oil price fluctuations. An oil price hike (or slump) driven by world
economic activities tends to stimulate (or dampen) the domestic economy and bring some infla-
tionary (or deflationary) pressure. Therefore, such oil price hike (or slump) induces a tightening
(or expansionary) monetary policy response. An oil price hike (or slump), however, caused by oil
supply disruption and oil speculative demand tends to dampen (or stimulate ) domestic economy
and requires an expansionary (or tightening) monetary response to accommodate any unwanted




































































































































































it = i+Λπ π̂t +ΛY Ŷt +ΛRER ˆRER (1.50)





























































































(1+ ς +ϕDtSdt) (1.61)














Optimized policy Rule: it = i+0.014π̂t +1.40Ŷt +1.98 ˆRER
Standard Deviation



































Order 1 2 3 4 5
idt 0.9476 0.8948 0.8425 0.7912 0.7414
Pot 0.8966 0.8093 0.7354 0.6726 0.6192
πt 0.9011 0.8116 0.7308 0.6579 0.5923
Wt 0.9321 0.8686 0.8093 0.7542 0.7032
Yt 0.896 0.8066 0.7297 0.6633 0.6059
Y xt 0.9273 0.8628 0.8052 0.7534 0.7067
Ct 0.9894 0.9748 0.9573 0.9379 0.9173
Cot 0.8967 0.8094 0.7355 0.6728 0.6194
Y ot 0.8965 0.8092 0.7352 0.6724 0.619
RERt 0.8844 0.7868 0.7042 0.6342 0.5748
Table 1.2: The Results of the optimized Policy Rule
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Figure 1.1: The Optimal Monetary Policy Impulse Response to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by
Oil Supply Disruption Shock.
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Figure 1.2: The Impulse Response of Domestic Consumption and Domestic Wages to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Supply Disruption Shock.



















Figure 1.3: The Impulse Response of Domestic Output and Real Exchange Rate to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Supply Disruption Shock.
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Figure 1.4: The Impulse Response of Domestic Oil Consumption and Oil in Domestic Production
to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by Oil Supply Disruption Shock.






















Figure 1.5: The Impulse Response of Domestic Investment and Domestic Inflation to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Supply Disruption Shock.
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Figure 1.6: The Optimal Monetary Policy Impulse Response to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by
World Economic Activities Shock.
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Figure 1.7: The Impulse Response of Domestic Exports, Domestic Consumption, and Domestic
Wages to to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by World Economic Activities Shock.























Figure 1.8: The Impulse Response of Domestic Output, Domestic Investment, and Real Exchange
Rate to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by World Economic Activities Shock.
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Figure 1.9: The Impulse Response of Domestic Output and Domestic Inflation to Oil Price Fluc-
tuations Caused by World Economic Activities Shock.



















Figure 1.10: The Impulse Response of Oil in Domestic Production to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused
by World Economic Activities Shock.
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Figure 1.11: The Optimal Monetary Policy Impulse Responses to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused
by Oil Speculative Demand Shock.
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Figure 1.12: The Impulse Response of Domestic Consumption and Domestic Wages to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Speculative Demand Shock.


















Figure 1.13: The Impulse Response of Domestic Output and Real Exchange Rate to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Speculative Demand Shock.
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Figure 1.14: The Impulse Response of Domestic Oil Consumption and Oil in Domestic Production
to Oil Price Fluctuations Caused by Oil Speculative Demand Shock.






















Figure 1.15: The Impulse Response of Domestic Investment and Domestic Inflation to Oil Price
Fluctuations Caused by Oil Speculative Demand Shock.
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Chapter 2
The Dynamic of Oil Shocks on Monetary
Policy Response and Macroeconomic




This chapter constructs a structural VAR model that jointly captures the interaction between the
monetary policy, the exchange rate and the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations. The model
explores the dynamic effects of different oil shocks on domestic macroeconomic aggregates and
how the monetary policy responds to these oil shocks across oil-exporting and oil-importing open
economies. The model considers oil price fluctuations caused by oil supply disruption shock, oil
demand driven by world economic activities, and oil specific-demand shock driven by precaution-
ary demand for oil. The model follows the of Kilian (2009) in identifying different shocks un-
derlying oil price fluctuations and follows Kim & Roubini (2000) in identifying monetary policies
under an open economy framework. The identification scheme in this chapter avoids the common
potential misspecification in the literature by constructing the model at monthly frequency under
economically plausible restrictions.
2.2 Literature Review
The seminal work of Kilian (2009) on identifying the different shocks underlying oil price fluc-
tuations lays the foundations for a growing literature on the dynamic of these oil price shocks to
re-examine their effects on macroeconomic aggregates. Kilian (2009) structurally decomposes the
oil price into i) oil supply disruption shock ii) oil demand shock driven by world economic ac-
tivities, and iii) oil-specific demand shock driven by precautionary demand for oil. Kilian (2009)
reports that an oil supply disruptions lead to a temporary decline in U.S. real GDP and a small
increase in inflation, the world oil demand shocks lead to positive initial effect followed by a de-
cline on U.S. real GDP and, the oil specific-demand shocks lead to a decline in U.S. real GDP
but increase inflation. Aastveit et al. (2014), however, separate the oil demand for different groups
of countries, namely developed and developing countries. The study finds developed countries
responded more negatively to an oil price shock than developing countries, and that the demand
from developing countries is twice as important as the oil demand from developed countries.
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Hamilton (2003) reports that an oil price increase is more important than an oil price de-
crease, particularly in forecasting GDP. Hamilton (2011), further, reports that ten out of eleven
postwar recessions were preceded by an oil price hike in the United States. Blanchard & Gali
(2007) argue that the diminishing effect of the recent oil shocks is due to i) the decline in real
wage rigidities, ii) the higher credibility of monetary policies, and iii) the decline of oil share in
productions. However, Kilian (2009) rejects these hypotheses and identifies different oil supply
and demand shocks in the international oil market. He argues that the effects of oil price shocks
depends on whether the oil price shock is due to world demand for oil or due to global oil supply
disruptions. Furthermore, Kilian (2009) shows that oil supply shocks were more important in the
past, but oil demand shocks became more significant in the recent oil price fluctuations.
Kilian & Lewis (2011) find the federal funds rate rises in response to an oil price hike driven
by world economic activities and oil specific-demand shocks. However, the federal funds rate
falls in response to oil supply disruption shock. Peersman & Robays (2012) examine the effect of
different oil shocks on macroeconomic aggregates for industrialized developed economies, namely
the U.S., Japan, U.K., Italy, Germany, France, Canada, Norway, and Australia. They find that if the
demand factors drive the oil price movements, the real GDP exhibits a transitory decline in almost
all these economies. The oil supply shock, however, leads to a permanent fall in economic activity
in all the oil-importing economies in their sample. Ahmed & Park (1995) examine the sources
of macroeconomic fluctuations for small open economies, specifically seven OECD economies:
Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The main question in
this paper is to examine how relevant external shocks are relative to internal shocks in explaining
the business cycle. The empirical results show that external shocks were better in explaining the
domestic macroeconomic fluctuations, which supports the real-business cycle proposition.
Elder and Serletis (2010) estimate a model with disaggregated measures of investment and
find that uncertainty about oil prices tends to significantly lower real output in the United States.
They, however, provide an explanation for the failure of the oil price hikes in inducing severe
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recessions and which is motivated by the relatively low uncertainty about oil prices in recent years.
Elder & Serletis (2009) find that increased uncertainty about oil prices also has a negative
effect on real-output in Canada. They argue that the relatively low uncertainty about oil prices
in mid the 80s may explain the failure of the sharp decline in oil prices in stimulating economic
growth in Canada. The sharp decline in oil prices then raised the uncertainty about oil prices and
hence weakened output growth. Moreover, Elder & Serletis (2009) show an asymmetric response
in real output to negative and positive price shocks. As uncertainty about future oil prices increases,
negative oil price shock fails to stimulate real-output, while positive oil shock tends to depress the
real-output in Canada.
Rahman & Serletis (2010) extend the work of [Elder and Serletis (2009), Rahman and Ser-
letis (2011), and others] by incorporating the monetary policy shock along with oil shocks to
examine their effect on macroeconomic activities in the United States under high and low oil price
volatility regimes. Rahman and Serletis (2010) find that under a high oil price volatility regime,
output growth falls by more as opposed to a low oil price volatility regime. Interestingly, the
study finds that the monetary policy reinforces the effect of oil price volatility and determines the
asymmetric response of U.S. output to oil price shocks.
Rahman & Serletis (2011) focus on oil price uncertainty and its effect on the U.S. real eco-
nomic activity implementing a bivariate VAR with asymmetric GARCH-in-mean errors. They use
the conditional variance of changes forecast error in the oil price as a measure for oil price un-
certainty. Consistent with the oil price-output literature, the study finds evidence that links the
increased uncertainty about oil price and the weakened average growth rate of real economic ac-
tivities.
Rahman & Serletis (2012) examine the relationship between the real economic activities in
Canada and oil price uncertainty. The study finds that as uncertainty about oil price fluctuations
increases, it is associated with lower average growth rate in real output in Canada. The study also
confirms the asymmetric effect of the oil price on real economic activities in Canada consistent
with Elder and Serletis (2009), and Rahman and Serletis (2010).
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Serletis & Istiak (2013) examine the nature of the relationship between oil price and indus-
trial production for the G-7 economies using slope-based tests and impulse response function test.
The null hypothesis of slope-based tests is a linear symmetric relationship between industrial pro-
duction and the oil price. The paper fails to reject the null hypothesis of linearity and symmetry in
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. However, the paper rejects the null hypothesis
of linearity and symmetry in the United States.
Grilli & Roubini (1995) have shown that small open economies implement tightening re-
sponse of monetary policy once exchange rate depreciation was observed. The mechanism through
which monetary policies affect the real economy takes different channels. As in Mishkin (1996),
these channels include interest rates, exchange rates, equity prices, and credit channels. This chap-
ter focuses on interest rate, and exchange rate channels under an open economy framework. Ex-
change rate and interest rate are particularly important channels through which different external
shocks, including oil shocks, can be transmitted to domestic macroeconomic aggregates. For open
economies, Cushman & Zha (1997) and Kim & Roubini (2000) focused particularly on identifying
the monetary policies. While Cushman & Zha (1997) estimate a large SVAR model for Canada
using block exogeneity, Kim & Roubini (2000) estimate a relatively smaller model with robust
results.
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2.3 Structural VAR Model:
Following Kim & Roubini (2000), suppose that the economy is described by a structural form
equation :
Θ(L)Yt = εt (2.1)











q =⇒ Θ(L) = Θ0 +Θ
0(L)
Note that Θ0 is the contemporaneous coefficient matrix on L
0 in the structural form.
The reduced form SVAR is given as:
Yt = B(L)Yt + et (2.2)
As discussed in Kim & Roubini (2000), the parameters in the structural form can be written as:
B(L) =−Θ−10 Θ
0(L)
The relationship between the structural disturbances and the reduced form residual can be

































































































1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
θ21 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
θ31 θ32 1 0 0 0 0 0
θ41 θ42 θ43 1 0 0 0 0
θ51 θ52 θ53 θ54 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 θ64 θ65 1 θ67 0
0 0 θ73 0 0 θ76 1 θ78



















































































This chapter builds on identification scheme of Kilian (2009) to identify the underlying
causes of oil price fluctuations. Kilian (2009) states “this paper heavily relies on delay restric-
tions that are economically plausible only at the monthly frequency.” Most of the work that builds
on Kilian’s identification tends to ignore that statement, and identify their models at quarterly
frequencies [See Aastveit et al. (2014), Peersman & Robays (2012)]. This chapter avoids that







Oil supply disruption shocks (εost ) are defined as “unpredictable innovations” to world oil
production. Due to adjustment costs in oil production, the short-term oil supply curve is vertical
within the month. The assumption also captures the delayed decision making process of crude
oil production in OPEC countries. The shifts in the oil supply short-term curve are oil supply
disruptions in the oil market1. For oil-exporting economies, domestic oil production is used. For
1Kilian & Murphy (2013) shows that the price elasticity of oil supply is around 0.02. The study confirms that oil
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World real economic activity is treated as an exogenous variable and contemporaneously un-




are defined as “unpredictable innovations”
to world economic activities that are not explained by oil supply shock. Kilian’s index for world
real economic activities is included to capture the demand shock driven by world economic ac-
tivities. For short, oil demand driven by world economic activities is noted as “world oil demand
shock.”












are oil specific-demand shocks driven by precautionary demand for
oil defined as “unpredictable innovations” to real oil price that are not explained by oil supply
shock and world economic activities shock. The oil price movements as a result of this oil specific-
demand shock are highly correlated with an “Independent measures of the precautionary demand
component of the real price of oil based on futures prices” as stated in Killian (2009). Alquist &
Kilian (2010) find this correlation to be around 80%.












The central bank in open economies implements a monetary policy rule that reacts to inter-
national oil price and exchange rate fluctuations. Due to an information delay assumption, world
real economic activity, domestic industrial production, CPI, and world oil production are excluded
from the contemporaneous policy response function of the central bank. To account for inflationary
pressures, the domestic central bank responds contemporaneously to international oil price and ex-
change rate fluctuations. The model follows Kim & Roubini (2000) to identify the monetary policy
under an open economy framework. Although Kim & Roubini (2000) restrict the monetary policy
authority from contemporaneously responding to the U.S. fed rate, Cushman and Zha (1997) relax
that restriction. Kim & Roubini (2000) argue that domestic monetary authorities are more inter-
ested in the movements of nominal exchange rates against the U.S dollar rather than movements in
U.S. Fed rate. Due to the large size of the model in this chapter and its focus on the caused of oil
price shocks, the U.S. Federal Fund rate is dropped from the model. The exchange rate is included
not only as an important channel for external shocks but also to account for its interaction with
domestic monetary policy under an open economy framework. As a forward-looking asset price,












Both the real income and the nominal interest rate determine the demand for real money bal-
ances. It is assumed that the demand for real money balances does not respond contemporaneously
to the other variables in the model.
42
2.5 Estimation of The Model
This chapter considers monthly data of oil production, Kilian’s index for world real economic
activities, international oil price, domestic industrial production, domestic CPI, domestic monetary
aggregate (M1), domestic interest rate, and exchange rate per U.S. dollar. The data are collected
for two groups: i) Oil importers: Japan (1973-2013), the United Kingdom (1975-2013), Thailand
(1990-2013), South Korea (1990-2013), Denmark (1974-2013), and Sweden (1973-2013); ii) Oil
exporters: Canada (1986-2013), Norway (1993-2013), and Mexico (1990-2013). The data are col-
lected from the countries’ Central Banks, the Federal Reserve Economic Data, and the IMF. This
chapter considers the impulse responses to different shocks underlying oil price fluctuations: 1)
unanticipated oil supply disruption shock, 2) unanticipated oil demand shock driven by world real
economic activities, and 3) unanticipated oil specific-demand driven by the precautionary demand
for oil. In order to track global real economic activities, Kilian (2009) constructs a monthly index
to capture the component of global real economic activities driving the demand for industrial com-
modities in international industrial commodities markets. Kilian’s index for world real economic
activity is built on various studies in the literature confirming a positive correlation between ocean
freight rates, world economic activities and business cycles [See Isserlis (1938), Klovland (2002),
Kilian (2009)].
Hamilton & Herrera (2004) find evidence to support a longer lag selection to capture the oil
shock dynamic effects, and suggests at least 12 lags specification. This chapter estimates the model
under 12 lags specification. This chapter shall focus on the impulse responses to these different oil
shocks. As in Kim & Roubini (2000), the confidence bands are constructed with one-standard error
bands. This paper first conducts a maximum likelihood test for the over-identifying restrictions.
The null hypothesis is that the restrictions imposed in the model presented in this chapter are valid2.
2 See Table 2.1 and 2.2 for the results of the over-identifying test.
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2.6 Results
2.6.1 The Dynamic Effects of the Underlying Causes of Oil Price Fluctua-
tions in Oil Exporting Economies
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Canada
The empirical results suggest that the policy interest rate responses to the underlying causes of
oil price fluctuations are asymmetric in Canada. The results indicate that policy interest rate rises in
response to unanticipated world oil demand shock and falls in response to unanticipated oil-specific
demand shock. No significant interest rate response to unanticipated oil supply disruption shock is
documented. The unanticipated world oil demand shock tends to stimulate the domestic economy
and bring some inflationary pressures on domestic CPI. The unanticipated world oil demand and
oil-specific demand shocks have an immediate appreciation effect on exchange rate. The forecast
error variance decomposition for Canada are reported in Table 2.3. At 12-48 month horizon,
world oil demand explains 13.18-20.78% of output variation, and 8.61-10.99% of exchange rate
variation. At 12-48 month horizon, oil-specific demand shock explains 8-41.91% of domestic CPI
variation, 3.7-12.13% of exchange rate variation, and 9.06-26% of the policy interest rate variation
in Canada.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Nor-
way
In Norway, the empirical results suggest that the response of the domestic policy interest rate
to the underlying shocks of oil price fluctuations are symmetric. In contrast to Canada, the policy
interest rate falls in response to all the shocks that underly the oil price fluctuations. Unanticipated
oil supply disruption shock leads to an immediate, statistically significant exchange rate appre-
ciation. Unanticipated oil specific demand shock leads to an immediate statistically significant
exchange rate appreciation but a delayed statistically significant exchange rate depreciation after
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the 6th month. The unanticipated oil supply disruption shock has an immediate statistically signif-
icant negative effect on domestic economic activities in Norway. It emphasizes the dependency of
Norwegian economy on the oil industries and oil production. Unanticipated oil supply disruption
and oil specific demand shocks bring inflationary pressure on domestic CPI.
The forecast error variance decomposition for Norway are reported in Table 2.4. At 12-48
months horizon, oil supply disruption shock explains 43.16-25.77% of the domestic output vari-
ation, 4-20.27% of the domestic CPI variation, 14.2-23.5% of the exchange variation, and 1.3-
24.03% of interest rate variation. At 12 months horizon, oil specific-demand shock explains about
22.95% of CPI variation, and 10.39% of interest rate variation.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Mex-
ico
The empirical results indicate that the interest rate falls in response to unanticipated oil supply
disruption and world oil demand shocks. Unanticipated oil specific-demand shock has an immedi-
ate statistically significant positive effect on domestic economic activities. Unanticipated oil supply
disruption and world oil demand shocks have an immediate statistically significant deflationary ef-
fect on domestic CPI, while oil specific demand shock has the opposite effect. Unanticipated
world oil demand shock has an immediate statistically significant appreciation effect on exchange
rate. The forecast error variance decomposition for Mexico are reported in Table 2.5. At 12-48
months horizon, oil supply disruption shock explains 1.6-24.2% of the domestic output variation,
and 12.23-10.06% of interest rate variation. At 12-48 month horizon, world oil demand explains
23-16% of domestic CPI variation, 16-12% of exchange rate variation, and 10.6-8.6% of interest
rate variation.
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2.6.2 The Dynamic Effects of the Underlying Causes of Oil Price Fluctua-
tions in Oil Importing Economies
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Japan
The empirical results report that the policy interest rate rises in response to unanticipated world
oil demand and oil specific demand shocks; however, the interest rate falls in response to unantic-
ipated oil supply disruption shock. The unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific-demand
shocks have an immediate positive and statistically significant effect on domestic economic activ-
ities. However, after the 10th month, oil specific demand shock tends to have a negative effect
on domestic economic activities in Japan. Unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific de-
mand shocks have an immediate positive statistically significant persistent effect on domestic CPI.
The forecast error variance decomposition for Japan are reported in Table 2.6. At 12-48 months
horizon, world oil demand shock explains 18.53-17.45% of output variation and 12.92-13.32% of
interest rate variation.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in the
United Kingdom
The empirical results indicate that policy interest rate rises in response to unanticipated world
oil demand and oil specific-demand shocks. The unanticipated world oil demand shock stimulates
domestic output with an immediate statistically significant effect, while unanticipated oil-specific
demand shock has an immediate statistically significant negative effect on domestic output. The
results report an immediate statistically significant appreciation effect on exchange rate after an
unanticipated world oil demand shock; however, unanticipated oil-specific demand shock leads
to an immediate statistically significant appreciation effect but a delayed depreciation effect on
exchange rate. Both unanticipated world oil demand and oil-specific demand shocks have an
immediate statistically significant inflationary effect on CPI; however, unanticipated oil supply
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disruption shock tends to have a deflationary effect on domestic CPI. The forecast error variance
decomposition for the United Kingdom are reported in Table 2.7. At 12-48 months horizon, oil
supply disruption shock explains 16.7-20.5% of the domestic CPI variation, and 4.01-18.8% of
exchange rate. At 12-48 months horizon, world oil demand shock explains 11.9-17.2% of the
domestic CPI variation, and 16.3-12.6% of exchange rate variation. At 12-48 months horizon, oil
specific-demand shock explains 10.70-50.54% of the domestic output variation, and 16.08-12.15%
of interest rate variation.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Thai-
land
The empirical results show that the interest rate falls in response to unanticipated oil supply
disruption shock and rises in response to oil specific demand shock. The unanticipated oil spe-
cific demand shocks have an immediate positive and statistically significant effect on domestic
economic activities. Unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific demand shocks have an im-
mediate positive statistically significant persistent effect on domestic CPI. Unanticipated oil supply
disruption shock has a negative effect on domestic output. The forecast error variance decompo-
sition for Thailand are reported in Table 2.8. At 12-48 months horizon, world oil demand shock
explains 6.2-14.91% of CPI variation and 15.08-17.35% of interest rate variation. At 12-48 months
horizon, oil specific-demand shock explains 14.84-20.56% of output variation and 11.73-12.81%
of exchange rate variation.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in South
Korea
The empirical results show that the interest rate falls in response to unanticipated world oil
demand, oil specific demand shocks, and oil supply disruption shock. Unanticipated world oil de-
mand and oil specific demand shocks have an immediate positive statistically significant persistent
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effect on domestic CPI. Unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific-demand shocks have an
immediate positive statistically significant effect on domestic economic activities. Unanticipated
oil supply disruption, world oil demand, and oil specific-demand shocks lead to an exchange rate
appreciation. The forecast error variance decomposition for South Korea are reported in Table
2.9. At 12-48 months horizon, world oil demand shock explains 13.7-36.69% of output variation,
and 13.26-9.49 % of CPI variation. At 12-48 months horizon, oil specific-demand shock explains
12.0-21.6% of CPI variation, 1.88-23.5% of exchange rate variation, and 10.58-13.95% of interest
rate variation.
Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Den-
mark
The empirical results show that the interest rate rises in response to unanticipated world oil
demand and oil specific demand shocks. The interest rate, however, falls in response to unantici-
pated oil supply disruption shock. Unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific demand shocks
have an immediate positive statistically significant persistent effect on domestic CPI. Unantici-
pated world oil demand shock leads to higher domestic output. Unanticipated world oil demand
and oil specific demand shocks lead to an immediate exchange rate appreciation. Unanticipated
oil supply disruption shock, however, leads to immediate statistically significant exchange rate
depreciation. The forecast error variance decomposition for Denmark are reported in Table 2.10.
At 12-48 months horizon, world oil demand shock explains 26.98-20.81% of CPI variation and
12.26-13.56% of interest rate variation. At 12-48 months horizon, oil specific-demand shock ex-
plains 12.71-24.35% of CPI variation, and 3.58-17.57% of exchange rate variation.
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Interest Rate, Exchange Rate, CPI, Output and Different Oil Shocks in Swe-
den
The empirical results show that the interest rate rises in response to unanticipated world oil de-
mand and oil specific demand shocks. Unanticipated world oil demand and oil specific demand
shocks have an immediate positive statistically significant persistent effect on domestic CPI. Unan-
ticipated world oil demand shock has immediate positive statistically significant effect on domestic
economic activities. World oil demand and oil specific demand shocks lead to an immediate statis-
tically significant exchange rate appreciation. Unanticipated oil supply disruption shock, however,
leads to immediate statistically significant exchange rate depreciation. The forecast error variance
decomposition for Sweden are reported in Table 2.11. At 12-48 months horizon, world oil demand




This chapter constructs a structural VAR model that jointly captures the interaction between
the monetary policy, the exchange rate, and the underlying causes of oil price fluctuations. The
model in this chapter explores the dynamic of different oil shocks on domestic macroeconomic
aggregates and how the monetary policy responds to these oil shocks across open economies. The
model follows the seminal work of Kilian (2009) in identifying the different shocks underlying oil
price fluctuations and follows Kim and Roubini (2000) in identifying monetary policies under an
open economy framework.
The results indicate that the oil supply disruption shock tends to have a diminished effect across
oil-importing open economies. The oil demand shock driven by world economic activity, how-
ever, tends to stimulate domestic economic activities across oil exporting and oil importing open
economies. Both world oil demand and oil-specific demand shocks place an inflationary pressure
on domestic CPI across these economies. The results report asymmetric interest rate responses to
different oil shocks within and across these open economies. In Mexico, Norway, Japan, Thailand,
and Denmark; the interest rate falls in response to oil supply disruption shock. The results indicate
that the interest rate rises in response to world oil demand shock across oil importing economies.
The monetary policies, however, respond differently to oil-specific demand shock. The interest
rate rises in oil-importing economies like Japan, the U.K., Thailand, Denmark, and Sweden and
falls in oil-exporting economies like Canada, Norway, and Mexico.
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Table 2.1: Over-identifying Restrictions Test For Oil-importing Economies








Table 2.2: Over-identifying Restrictions Test For Oil-exporting Economies






Table 2.3: Canada - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Canada
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.20 7.87 7.63
World Oil Demand Shock 13.18 9.41 20.78
Oil Specific Demand Shock 5.25 4.84 4.24
IP Shock 59.30 48.42 28.60
CPI Shock 13.88 7.65 4.62
Money Demand Shock 0.63 1.22 3.14
Interest Rate Shock 1.73 9.88 13.90
Exchange Rate Shock 5.78 10.66 17.05
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Canada
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 2.63 5.59 4.02
World Oil Demand Shock 5.96 3.56 2.52
Oil Specific Demand Shock 8.00 16.32 41.91
IP Shock 0.79 1.00 11.56
CPI Shock 76.90 47.01 19.25
Money Demand Shock 1.59 2.93 4.57
Interest Rate Shock 3.10 21.68 11.10
Exchange Rate Shock 0.99 1.887 5.03
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Canada
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.57 1.29 2.66
World Oil Demand Shock 8.61 10.67 10.99
Oil Specific Demand Shock 3.70 2.96 12.13
IP Shock 3.35 7.27 6.55
CPI Shock 1.38 2.00 2.05
Money Demand Shock 17.68 12.23 9.64
Interest Rate Shock 4.96 19.63 13.88
Exchange Rate Shock 58.71 43.92 42.07
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Canada
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 3.49 2.58 4.33
World Oil Demand Shock 4.83 3.33 7.86
Oil Specific Demand Shock 9.06 36.82 26.44
IP Shock 3.8 11.74 15.02
CPI Shock 3.58 2.93 2.33
Money Demand Shock 14.53 9.39 14.45
Interest Rate Shock 52.92 24.57 17.62
Exchange Rate Shock 7.67 8.60 11.92
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Table 2.4: Norway - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Norway
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 43.16 29.25 25.77
World Oil Demand Shock 3.10 4.32 4.89
Oil Specific Demand Shock 5.22 5.26 5.80
IP Shock 25.22 19.84 17.37
CPI Shock 2.20 3.65 2.76
Money Demand Shock 12.87 25.34 27.49
Interest Rate Shock 2.70 3.09 3.05
Exchange Rate Shock 5.50 9.21 12.83
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Norway
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 4.20 12.18 20.27
World Oil Demand Shock 1.65 1.17 5.47
Oil Specific Demand Shock 22.95 12.86 5.49
IP Shock 7.73 5.88 4.09
CPI Shock 43.52 21.35 7.70
Money Demand Shock 17.02 21.36 24.93
Interest Rate Shock 2.35 4.69 3.45
Exchange Rate Shock 0.54 20.47 28.55
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Norway
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 14.20 26.31 23.53
World Oil Demand Shock 3.08 3.21 15.70
Oil Specific Demand Shock 9.50 7.20 4.79
IP Shock 11.48 9.81 5.96
CPI Shock 4.11 2.45 1.65
Money Demand Shock 6.34 6.65 10.21
Interest Rate Shock 1.12 0.85 2.93
Exchange Rate Shock 50.14 43.48 35.20
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Norway
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.33 12.85 24.03
World Oil Demand Shock 6.66 1.68 9.64
Oil Specific Demand Shock 10.39 6.15 2.89
IP Shock 1.13 6.36 5.07
CPI Shock 1.51 0.57 0.64
Money Demand Shock 13.88 32.31 23.64
Interest Rate Shock 57.84 6.81 2.85
Exchange Rate Shock 7.22 33.24 31.20
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Table 2.5: Mexico - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Mexico
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.61 27.36 24.24
World Oil Demand Shock 1.11 2.83 1.25
Oil Specific Demand Shock 0.78 2.25 7.69
IP Shock 76.35 46.54 35.27
CPI Shock 1.06 1.62 2.03
Interest Rate Shock 6.80 6.29 3.91
Exchange Rate Shock 12.26 13.09 25.59
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Mexico
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 3.33 1.30 1.48
World Oil Demand Shock 23.81 23.51 16.27
Oil Specific Demand Shock 4.98 2.42 11.81
IP Shock 5.10 9.89 18.44
CPI Shock 48.18 36.15 16.09
Interest Rate Shock 0.08 6.22 13.81
Exchange Rate Shock 14.56 20.48 22.07
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Mexico
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 5.35 3.35 3.29
World Oil Demand Shock 16.33 13.60 12.26
Oil Specific Demand Shock 2.62 3.94 18.77
IP Shock 10.72 9.91 11.47
CPI Shock 23.66 20.85 11.64
Interest Rate Shock 3.15 11.27 18.32
Exchange Rate Shock 38.15 37.04 24.22
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Mexico
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 12.23 9.89 10.06
World Oil Demand Shock 10.62 9.95 8.60
Oil Specific Demand Shock 2.43 9.80 18.12
IP Shock 18.94 20.25 15.64
CPI Shock 8.73 7.22 8.48
Interest Rate Shock 18.17 16.80 17.98
Exchange Rate Shock 28.85 26.06 21.10
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Table 2.6: Japan - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Japan
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.45 3.96 3.74
World Demand Shock 18.53 15.31 17.45
Oil Specific Demand Shock 6.48 4.83 6.90
IP Shock 62.13 57.33 49.10
CPI Shock 7.01 6.36 7.76
Money Demand Shock 1.43 2.64 2.58
Interest Rate Shock 1.36 7.03 10.11
Exchange Rate Shock 2.58 2.50 1.33
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Japan
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 8.10 5.16 5.13
World Demand Shock 4.53 17.17 12.76
Oil Specific Demand Shock 4.53 1.95 2.06
IP Shock 4.53 11.52 19.16
CPI Shock 49.91 29.65 22.48
Money Demand Shock 1.07 1.12 1.82
Interest Rate Shock 5.93 8.91 18.67
Exchange Rate Shock 24.19 24.49 17.89
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Japan
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.09 0.21 0.40
World Demand Shock 0.674 0.915 3.45
Oil Specific Demand Shock 0.743 3.12 6.45
IP Shock 2.59 5.02 5.61
CPI Shock 3.56 3.98 5.75
Money Demand Shock 0.91 1.53 2.26
Interest Rate Shock 6.79 13.68 13.96
Exchange Rate Shock 84.61 71.51 62.09
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Japan
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.69 0.50 0.52
World Demand Shock 12.92 16.07 13.32
Oil Specific Demand Shock 2.54 8.70 9.66
IP Shock 1.56 3.61 4.51
CPI Shock 11.25 10.48 8.82
Money Demand Shock 2.26 5.20 6.97
Interest Rate Shock 45.60 32.10 28.40
Exchange Rate Shock 23.16 23.31 27.76
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Table 2.7: United Kingdom - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
United Kingdom
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.53 0.83 1.70
World Oil Demand Shock 8.347 4.00 2.36
Oil Specific Demand Shock 10.70 41.69 50.54
IP Shock 70.10 41.54 23.84
CPI Shock 6.86 5.60 8.51
Interest Rate Shock 1.63 5.45 8.81
Exchange Rate Shock 1.80 0.86 4.19
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
United Kingdom
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 16.79 12.92 20.53
World Oil Demand Shock 11.91 15.87 17.20
Oil Specific Demand Shock 15.07 13.95 6.85
IP Shock 3.369 3.16 2.39
CPI Shock 29.43 14.23 5.89
Interest Rate Shock 19.04 18.32 9.82
Exchange Rate Shock 4.37 21.50 37.28
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
United Kingdom
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 4.01 11.67 18.86
World Oil Demand Shock 16.30 15.45 12.66
Oil Specific Demand Shock 2.16 5.96 10.47
IP Shock 7.97 10.38 13.22
CPI Shock 0.91 0.76 0.88
Interest Rate Shock 2.96 2.07 1.63
Exchange Rate Shock 65.65 53.69 42.25
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
United Kingdom
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.87 5.95 4.75
World Oil Demand Shock 5.40 5.15 4.20
Oil Specific Demand Shock 16.08 14.63 12.15
IP Shock 1.46 6.42 14.41
CPI Shock 4.21 7.44 6.91
Interest Rate Shock 65.11 48.92 43.36
Exchange Rate Shock 5.83 11.46 14.19
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Table 2.8: Thailand - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Thailand
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.26 3.46 3.43
World Oil Demand Shock 5.40 7.90 8.59
Oil Specific Demand Shock 14.84 18.89 20.56
IP Shock 54.44 38.56 26.71
CPI Shock 2.37 3.36 2.24
Money Demand Shock 3.39 4.18 8.98
Interest Rate Shock 12.06 17.10 15.10
Exchange Rate Shock 6.19 6.51 14.35
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Thailand
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 3.60 6.13 6.36
World Oil Demand Shock 6.26 9.90 14.910
Oil Specific Demand Shock 12.04 9.58 4.16
IP Shock 1.30 2.86 7.79
CPI Shock 53.68 45.30 14.52
Money Demand Shock 2.85 2.51 0.78
Interest Rate Shock 13.09 12.47 34.52
Exchange Rate Shock 7.14 11.22 16.94
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Thailand
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.61 5.21 5.31
World Oil Demand Shock 8.17 10.35 6.60
Oil Specific Demand Shock 11.73 11.04 12.81
IP Shock 4.96 7.94 14.79
CPI Shock 2.28 3.52 3.83
Money Demand Shock 6.71 4.46 3.38
Interest Rate Shock 17.38 19.97 30.96
Exchange Rate Shock 48.12 37.48 22.28
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Thailand
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.50 2.03 3.13
World Oil Demand Shock 15.08 21.16 17.35
Oil Specific Demand Shock 1.18 4.54 12.27
IP Shock 8.32 17.19 19.77
CPI Shock 6.71 5.66 5.29
Money Demand Shock 12.52 9.97 7.84
Interest Rate Shock 52.38 31.18 21.47
Exchange Rate Shock 3.27 8.24 2.84
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Table 2.9: South Korea - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
S. Korea
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 6.43 6.14 4.16
World Oil Demand Shock 13.71 26.58 36.69
Oil Specific Demand Shock 1.42 0.98 2.06
IP Shock 42.72 40.78 39.35
CPI Shock 11.71 8.29 5.35
Interest Rate Shock 4.88 3.18 2.08
Exchange Rate Shock 19.09 14.01 10.28
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
S. Korea
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 4.09 4.49 8.40
World Oil Demand Shock 13.26 10.74 9.49
Oil Specific Demand Shock 12.00 13.59 21.63
IP Shock 6.21 19.67 30.51
CPI Shock 44.17 33.01 16.75
Interest Rate Shock 6.66 7.92 7.15
Exchange Rate Shock 13.58 10.55 6.03
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
S. Korea
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 3.22 4.91 4.16
World Oil Demand Shock 1.53 1.70 1.58
Oil Specific Demand Shock 1.88 10.46 23.56
IP Shock 1.86 1.95 5.96
CPI Shock 15.06 14.08 11.29
Interest Rate Shock 8.26 6.28 6.20
Exchange Rate Shock 68.16 60.60 47.23
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
S. Korea
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.01 2.61 5.48
World Oil Demand Shock 3.06 6.10 5.22
Oil Specific Demand Shock 10.58 15.67 13.95
IP Shock 4.58 5.26 4.89
CPI Shock 17.62 11.51 10.94
Interest Rate Shock 17.73 14.34 12.51
Exchange Rate Shock 45.38 44.47 46.97
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Table 2.10: Denmark - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Denmark
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 7.60 7.37 7.15
World Oil Demand Shock 1.61 2.43 2.45
Oil Specific Demand Shock 6.51 6.69 8.09
IP Shock 62.46 50.87 47.83
CPI Shock 7.84 11.74 9.36
Money Demand Shock 7.43 7.18 5.54
Interest Rate Shock 0.66 2.71 10.53
Exchange Rate Shock 5.86 10.98 9.02
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Denmark
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 6.69 5.13 2.54
World Oil Demand Shock 26.98 33.74 20.81
Oil Specific Demand Shock 12.71 25.84 24.35
IP Shock 1.38 2.00 6.65
CPI Shock 40.46 26.23 30.64
Money Demand Shock 8.46 5.03 6.50
Interest Rate Shock 0.44 0.27 2.06
Exchange Rate Shock 2.84 1.72 6.42
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Denmark
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 7.36 13.37 12.15
World Oil Demand Shock 0.22 1.30 2.32
Oil Specific Demand Shock 3.58 10.310 17.57
IP Shock 1.73 1.51 3.14
CPI Shock 0.43 0.52 5.04
Money Demand Shock 3.74 3.14 6.67
Interest Rate Shock 2.13 1.12 2.52
Exchange Rate Shock 80.78 68.71 50.55
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Denmark
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.41 1.76 6.03
World Oil Demand Shock 12.26 17.70 13.56
Oil Specific Demand Shock 0.22 0.26 1.30
IP Shock 2.44 2.16 2.70
CPI Shock 0.89 1.91 2.56
Money Demand Shock 0.41 0.53 1.56
Interest Rate Shock 81.98 73.57 56.15
Exchange Rate Shock 1.35 2.08 16.09
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Table 2.11: Sweden - Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
Output
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Sweden
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 1.07 0.80 3.95
World Oil Demand Shock 29.31 21.72 18.00
Oil Specific Demand Shock 1.49 2.77 2.95
IP Shock 37.25 21.40 22.42
CPI Shock 1.08 2.85 3.55
Interest Rate Shock 20.46 41.79 40.76
Exchange Rate Shock 9.30 8.65 8.34
CPI
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Sweden
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.73 1.49 2.49
World Oil Demand Shock 14.04 24.12 32.02
Oil Specific Demand Shock 9.91 6.80 6.69
IP Shock 3.7 1.44 1.29
CPI Shock 58.21 48.11 36.22
Interest Rate Shock 12.14 14.86 17.04
Exchange Rate Shock 1.25 3.15 4.22
Exchange Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Sweden
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.84 5.60 7.95
World Oil Demand Shock 8.49 10.35 12.31
Oil Specific Demand Shock 2.27 3.49 4.02
IP Shock 0.22 1.96 1.72
CPI Shock 1.12 1.30 1.27
Interest Rate Shock 3.09 6.38 5.12
Exchange Rate Shock 83.94 70.88 67.58
Interest Rate
Country 12 Months 24 Months 48 Months
Sweden
Oil Supply Disruption Shock 0.27 3.07 2.55
World Oil Demand Shock 15.86 24.65 24.79
Oil Specific Demand Shock 6.12 3.74 6.77
IP Shock 2.43 5.46 8.90
CPI Shock 3.75 6.85 5.67
Interest Rate Shock 60.01 46.93 41.98
Exchange Rate Shock 11.53 9.28 9.31
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Oil Prices, Credit Risks in Banking Systems,




The recent 2014-2015 oil price slump has placed a macroeconomic pressure on oil exporting
economies and their banking systems. With the current global macroeconomic conditions, inter-
national oil markets could enter a sustained period of low oil prices. The macroeconomic conse-
quences of low oil prices on oil exporting economies are well documented. Chapter 3, however,
focuses on the effect of the oil price slumps on the GCC banking stability. The first objective of
Chapter 3 is to assess the oil price shock transmission channels, along with other macroeconomic
shocks, to GCC banks’ balance sheets. This part of Chapter 3 implements a System Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) model of Blundell & Bond (1998) and a Panel Fixed Effect Model
to estimate the response of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to its macroeconomic determinants. The
second objective of Chapter 3 is to assess any negative feedback effects between the GCC banking
systems and the real economy. This second part of Chapter 3 implements a Panel VAR model to
explore financial linkages between GCC banking systems and the real economy. The results find
strong linkages between oil price fluctuations and nonperforming loans (NPLs) and further nega-
tive feedback effects from instability in banking systems to the GCC macroeconomy. Declines in
oil prices increase NPLs, as do the declines in non-oil GDP and stock prices.
3.2 Literature Review
The recent financial crisis triggered the interest on the financial instability in banking systems
and its influence on the macroeconomic instability. The work of Bernanke et al. (1999) lays a
theoretical model with financial acceleration that links incomplete financial markets and the real
economy. The work of Bernanke et al. (1999) aims to understand how endogenously determined
credit frictions propagate disturbance and spread to the macroeconomy. The theoretical foundation
of the role of credit risk shocks and its implications on the real economy are well grounded in the
literature. The relevant literature to Chapter 3 are i) the determinants of nonperforming loans
(NPLs), as a measurement for credit risk in the banking systems, and ii) the feedback relationship
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between the financial instability in banking systems and the real economy.
The literature on NPLs recognizes two major determinants explain the variation of NPLs.
The first part of this literature assesses the macroeconomic determinants of NPLs which influence
the the banks’ balance sheets and the debt-service capacity of the borrowers. The macroeconomic
determinants of NPLs include business cycles, exchange rate pressure, unemployment rates, and
lending rates. The second part of this literature focuses on bank-specific determinants of NPLs
which vary across banks. The bank-specific determinants of NPLs include differences in risk
managements, operation costs, and the sizes of the banks. A comprehensive review of the literature
on both parts are covered by Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), Espinoza and Prasad (2010), Nkusu
(2011), and Klein (2013).
Keeton & Morris (1987) is one of the early work to discuss the causes of loan loss variation
across banks. They study the insured commercial banks in the United States and the effect of loan
losses variations across these banks on managerial risk preferences and the local economic condi-
tions. Berger and DeYoung (1997) use Granger causality techniques to examine the relationships
among loan quality, cost efficiency, and bank capital across commercial banks in the United States.
They find loan quality Granger causes cost efficiency and vice-versa. Further, the study finds low
levels of cost efficiency is preceded by an increase in NPLs.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) demonstrate that the instability of banking systems may trig-
ger the beginning of a financial crisis. The study finds evidence from the 1990s crisis of emerging
economies which indicates credit risks in banking systems typically lead to a currency crisis. The
currency crisis, the study finds, deepens the crisis of banking systems and later spreads to the entire
economy. This strand of the literature focuses on the adverse impact of credit risks on the stability
of the financial sector.
Jesus and Gabriel (2006) find empirical evidence of a positive lagged relationship between
rapid credit growth and NPLs. Their work examines the lending cycle and the required conditions
and standards of the loans. The study empirically confirms that the banks, during the economic
booms, tend to be more tolerant in both screening borrowers and collateral requirements.
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Marcucci & Quagliariello (2009) study credit risks and the business cycles across different
credit risk regimes in Italy. Their results confirm that the effect of business cycles on credit risks
is more evident in weak financial conditions and hence there is a strong relationship between
the severity of the financial crisis and the state of the economy. In another study, Marcucci and
Quagliariello (2008) further examine the default rates of borrowers on Italian banks and their
cyclical behavior. The results find default rates in the Italian banking system fall in economic
booms and rise in economic recessions. The results confirm the intuitive relationship between
credit risk and weak economic conditions.
Espinoza and Prasad (2010) is one of the few work in the literature that examines the banks
in GCC region. They find that the NPL ratio increases as economic growth weakens and interest
rates rises. However, Espinoza and Prasad (2010) cover the GCC banks before the financial crisis
of 2008 and do not include oil prices. As oil exporting economies, oil prices are major and relevant
determinant of NPLs across the region. The main focus of this chapter is to examine the effect of
the oil price slumps on the GCC banking stability. Nkusu (2011) studies the link betwee NPLs and
macroeconomic variables in advanced economies. The study finds that an adverse macroeconomic
shock leads to a higher level of NPLs. Further, the study shows that a sharp increase in NPLs lead
to a poor macroeconomic performance and weak economic growth.
Louzis et al. (2012) examine the determinants of NPLs in the Greek banking system. The
study finds that macroeconomic determinants in Greece have a strong impact on NPLs across the
banks. In particular, NPLs are largely explained by the GDP growth, the unemployment rate, the
lending rate, and the public debt.
The work of Klein (2013) examines the NPLs in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Eu-
rope (CESEE). The study looks at both bank-specific and macroeconomic factors and finds that
the macroeconomic conditions have a stronger explanatory power across the CESEE region. Par-
ticularly, NPLs respond to GDP growth, unemployment and inflation across the region. Messai &
Jouini (2013) study the determinants of NPLs in Italy, Greece and, Spain which suffered from the
2008 subprime crisis. The study finds that the increase in GDP growth lowers the credit risk as do
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General Government Gross Debt General Government Revenue Fuel exports
Country (% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of merchandise exports)
2008-2012 2013 2014 2008-2012 2013 2014 2008-2012 2013 2014
Saudi Arabia 8.7 2.2 1.6 43.1 41.4 37.3 88.65 87.42 ..
UAE 18.7 15.9 15.7 37.1 41 37.7 64.81 .. ..
Kuwait 9.5 6.4 6.9 69 71.8 68.7 94.85 94.22 ..
Qatar 30.8 32.3 31.7 40.4 52.2 47.4 87.89 88.68 87.81
Bahrain 26.5 43.5 43.8 24.2 24 24.1 69.6 .. ..
Oman 5.5 5.1 5.1 45 49.1 47.2 79.44 82.54 83.53
Sources: MCD October 2015 Regional Economic Outlook (IMF) and Development Indicators (World Bank).
Table 3.1: Oil and Macroeconomic Indicators in GCC Region
a decline in unemployment rates.
3.3 The Economies of Gulf Cooperation Council Region
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman are GCC oil
exporters and any fluctuations in international oil price could influence their GDP growth, gov-
ernment budgets, fiscal revenues, development programs and exports. As shown in Table 3.1, the
fossil fuel exports in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait exceeded 80% of the total exports. For
UAE, Oman, and Bahrain that ratio exceeded 60% of the total exports. The oil revenues account
for more than 50% of total government revenues in these economies. The high oil-dependency
reflects a high level of exposure of GCC economies to external shocks that could further threaten
the financial markets and the stability of banking systems. GCC countries, however, accumulated
a large amount of oil revenues that could help to smooth the severe fluctuations in international oil
prices. The low debt-to-GDP ratio, in most GCC countries, indicates that these economies have
the capacity and the fiscal space to maintain a sustainable level of debt if needed.
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Feedback to the Macro-economy 
- Credit  to Households  ! 
- Credit  to Corporates ! 
* Could trigger severe recession but the buffer may offset it. !
Oil Price Fluctuations 
- Oil Prices ! 
- Fiscal Oil Revenues ! 
- Reserve Accumulation ! 
- Fiscal Expenditures ! 
* Pressure on Exchange Rates. 
The Macro-economy 
- Stock Markets  ! 
- Real Estate Prices  ! 
- Household Incomes ! 
- Contracts to Corporate Sectors ! 
- Oil and Non-Oil GDP growth ! 
 
Banking System 
- Default Rates on Loans "  
Due to Exposure to i) Corporate and Households 
                                       ii) Real estate market, and Stock 
Market. 
 - Bank Deposits and Liquidity ! 
- Cost of Borrowing " 
!
Figure 3.1: Possible Scenarios of the Transmission Channel of Oil Price Slumps to Banking Sys-
tems
3.3.1 The Effect of Oil Price Fluctuations on Banking Systems in Oil Ex-
porting Economies
Figure 3.1 lays out the potential dynamic of oil price slumps on oil exporting economies and its
transmission channels to the banks’ balance sheets. As discussed earlier, fluctuations in interna-
tional oil price influence the GCC economic growth and their banking systems. A sustained decline
in oil prices, however, could lead to a decline in the liquidity and deposits of the GCC banking sys-
tem. The GCC banks are particularly exposed to investments in non-oil sectors that include real









































Mortgage, Real Estate and Construction Loans 
(In percent of total loans) 
IMF Source: National authorities. 
Table 3.2: The Shares of Real Estate in GCC Banking Loans.
Oil revenues influence the size of businesses and the depth of GCC financial and banking sys-
tems. GCC governments’ expenditures on construction and infrastructure programs drive domestic
non-oil GDP growth. GCC banks are particularly exposed to corporate sectors and households in
these sectors. The channels of this exposure to non-oil GDP sectors are either through financing
investments in stock markets real estate projects or through collateral requirements.
Table 3.2 1 shows the exposure of GCC banks to real estate and construction loans. With
more than 30%, Bahraini and Kuwaiti banks have the highest exposure rates to real estate and
construction sectors. Given the above scenarios, this chapter considers oil price, non-oil GDP,
lending interest rate, stock price, housing prices, and credit growth to examine the credit risk
1Lukonga et al (2016, forthcoming IMF Staff Discussion Note)
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implications of the recent oil price slumps on GCC banking systems.
3.4 Data Description
This chapter considers a panel data of GCC individual banks’ balance sheets from Fitch span-
ning 2000-2014 and macroeconomic data from the IMF. These include nonperforming loans ratio
(NPL), average oil price, real non-oil GDP, lending interest rate, 3-years average of credit growth,
stock prices, and housing prices. There are no indexes for GCC housing prices, however, this chap-
ter utilizes CPI components of Housing, Water, Electricity & other Fuels as a proxy for the housing
price indexes. In GCC region, the water and electricity are subsidized and the movements in this
component of the CPI are mostly due to movements in housing prices. This chapter acknowledges
that it may not be the optimal proxy for GCC housing prices but it might be the best feasible proxy
for these prices. All the data are reported in the Appendix under data descriptions. Overall, how-
ever, this chapter acknowledges that the sample size (38 banks) and the time span (2000-2014) of
the GCC banks considered for this chapter are relatively small to obtain precise estimates of the
effect of oil price fluctuations on GCC banking stability.
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3.5 The Macroeconomic Determinants of Credit Risk Across
GCC Banks
This part of Chapter 3 examines the transmission channels of oil price fluctuations to GCC
banks’ balance sheets and its macroeconomic determinants. This chapter employs a dynamic sys-
tem GMM and Fixed Effect models to estimate the response of nonperforming loans (NPLs) to
different macroeconomic shocks, particularly to oil price fluctuations.
3.5.1 Methodology: Dynamic Panel models
NPLi,t = γNPLi,t−1 +β
′
Xi,t +λi + ei,t
NPLi,t is the NPL of the ith bank at time t where i = 1, ..,N and t = 1, ..,T . Xi,t is a vector of
exogenous variables, λi is the panel-level fixed effect, and ei,t are i.i.d residuals. The analysis of
this part of Chapter 3 considers two alternative econometric techniques to estimate the dynamic
panel model: i) Fixed Effect model and ii) Dynamic System GMM Model. The former approach
removes the unobserved heterogeneity across the banks but has a limitation once the lagged depen-
dent variable is included. The fixed effect model with lagged dependent variable suffers “Dynamic
Panel bias.” This is a result of the correlation between the error term and the lagged dependent
variable after the demeaning process. The latter econometric technique implemented is a Dy-
namic System GMM model of Blundell & Bond (1998). The collapsing method of Holtz-Eakin
et al. (1988) is implemented to reduce the number of instruments in the model. Roodman (2006)
and Roodman (2014) provide an excellent review of the Dynamic System GMM Models. In this




The objective of this part of Chapter 3 is to estimate the response of nonperforming loans (NPLs)
to different macroeconomic shocks. Oil price is included in the analysis as a major macroeconomic
determinant of NPLs in the region and hence influence the debt-service capacity of the borrowers.
Non-Oil GDP also included as GCC banks largely exposed to corporate sectors and households in
these sectors. Stock prices are included in the analysis for two main reasons: i) higher stock prices
reflect higher income for households and corporate sectors, and ii) GCC banks are exposed to
investments in domestic stock markets. GCC lending rates are included in the analysis to account
for the borrowing cost across banks as a major determinant for NPLs. Housing prices are included
as: i) GCC banks are exposed to real estate and construction loans, and ii) real estates are used as a
collateral requirement for various types of loans. This chapter controls for the variations of credit
growth across banks and includes the 3-year average growth of bank-specific total loans.
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3.5.3 Econometric Results
The results of Arellano-Bond test reported in Table 3.3 rejects the null hypothesis of no autocor-
relation in the first differenced errors and fails to reject the null hypothesis in the second differenced
errors. Hence, the models pass Arellano-Bond tests, which are diagnostic tests for the validity of
the model (see Roodman (2006)). The results fail to reject that the over-identifying restrictions of
the instrument variables are valid (see Hansen Test in Table 3.3).
As a macroeconomic determinant of NPLs in the GCC region, a decline in oil price con-
tributes to higher level of NPLs as the declines in Non-oil GDP, and stock prices. The results in
Table 3.3 of the system GMM model (3) show a 1 percentage point decline in oil price growth leads
to a statistically significant increase in NPLs by 0.458%. A 1 percentage point decline in Non-oil
GDP leads to a statistically significant increase in NPLs by 0.708%. A 1 percentage point increase
in interest rate leads to a statistically significant increase in NPLs by 0.0219%. A 1 percentage
point decline in stock prices leads to a statistically significant increase in NPLs by 0.397%. A 1
percentage point decline in housing prices leads to a statistically significant increase in NPLs by
0.860%. The results indicate bank-specific credit growth rates are an insignificant determinant of
NPLs in the region. Perhaps, this insignificant explanatory power of bank-specific credit growth
reflects the macro-prudential measures and the strong financial regulation in the GCC region. The
results are qualitatively and quantitatively robust using log transformation and logit transforma-
tions of NPLs 2.
2The results for logit transformations of NPLs are reported in Table 3.7.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES System GMM FE System GMM FE
NPL Growtht−1 0.817*** 0.701*** 0.814*** 0.691***
[0.0878] [0.0508] [0.0800] [0.0488]
Oil Pricet−1 -0.00512*** -0.00679*** -0.00458*** -0.00586***
[0.00187] [0.00139] [0.00165] [0.00145]
NOGDP RGrowtht−1 -0.00835* -0.0131*** -0.00708* -0.0103***
[0.00420] [0.00323] [0.00374] [0.00307]
Interest Ratet−1 0.0231** 0.0514** 0.0219** 0.0512**
[0.00866] [0.0201] [0.00901] [0.0195]
Credit Growtht−1 0.00111 -0.00245 0.00397 -0.00210
[0.00485] [0.00445] [0.00490] [0.00444]
StockPrice Growtht−1 -0.00389*** -0.00290*** -0.00397*** -0.00310***
[0.000800] [0.000806] [0.000785] [0.000808]
HousingPrices Growtht−1 -0.00860** -0.00756**
[0.00361] [0.00292]
Constant 0.156 0.214* 0.158 0.235*
[0.194] [0.124] [0.175] [0.123]
Observations 467 467 463 463
R-squared 0.601 0.600
Number of id 38 38 38 38
No. of instruments 33 34
Hansen test p-value 0.180 0.166
A-B AR(1) test p-value 0.000641 0.000601
A-B AR(2) test p-value 0.164 0.156
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.3: Econometric Results of Fixed Effect and System GMM Models - Log transformation of
NPLs
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3.6 The Feedback Effect between Banking Instability and the
Real Economy across the GCC Region
3.6.1 Methodology: Panel Vector Auto Regressions (PVAR) model
Under the second part of Chapter 3, a Panel Vector Auto Regressions (PVAR) model is im-
plemented to assess the feedback effects between the banking systems and the real economy. To
assess the feedback effect of disturbances in the banking system, the analysis focuses on the im-
pulse responses to various structural shocks, particularly to credit risk shock and macroeconomic
shocks. To avoid the earlier discussed issue of panel dynamic bias, the model follows Helmert
transformation to demean the variables as in Love & Zicchino (2006). Canova & Ciccarelli (2013)
and Love & Zicchino (2006) provide a comprehensive review of Panel VAR models. The Panel
VAR used in this part is specified as:
Yi,t = Yi,t−1A+Xi,tB+λi + ei,t
Yi,t is a vector of endogenous variables at time t where i = 1, ..,N and t = 1, ..,T . Xi,t is a vector
of exogenous variables, λi is the panel-level fixed effect, and ei,t are i.i.d residuals.
3.6.2 Identification
The identification scheme in this part of Chapter 3 is a recursive Cholesky decomposition. Oil
price is modeled as an exogenous variable in the identification of this chapter. The domestic
variables are ordered as [Interest Rate, Non-oil GDP, Credit Growth, NPLs]. The macro variables
are set first as Interest Rate, then Non-oil GDP. The interest rate is set first as GCC central banks
adopt fixed exchange rate regimes and hence follow the U.S. Federal Fund Rate in setting domestic
policy interest rate. The bank-specific variables are ordered as Credit Growth, then NPLs. Credit
Growth responds contemporaneously to Interest Rate and Non-oil GDP, but with a lag to NPLs.
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NPLs respond contemporaneously to all the variables in model.
3.6.3 Results of the Panel Vector Auto Regressions
Figure 3.2 indicates credit risk shock, a shock to nonperforming loans, tends to restrict credit
growth across the banks and dampen economic growth in GCC economies. The interest rate de-
clines in response to credit risk shock. The results confirm a significant negative feedback between
the banking system instability and the real economy. A positive Non-oil GDP shock expands the
credit growth across the banks and lowers NPLs, however, Non-oil GDP shock increases the inter-
est rate (see Figure 3.3). An interest rate shock increases the cost of borrowing and hence leads to
higher level of NPLs and could slowdown the GCC economic growth. A positive shock to credit
growth across GCC banks leads to higher economic growth and lowers the NPLs across the region.
The variance decompositions are reported in Tables 3.4-3.6. The variance decomposition of
Non-oil GDP (see Table 3.5) across GCC economies indicates that oil price shock explains about
35% of Non-oil GDP variation, while NPLs explains almost 30% of the Non-oil GDP variation.
The variance decomposition of GCC credit growth (see Table 3.6) indicates that Non-oil GDP
shock explains about 17% of credit growth variation, interest rate shock explains about 11% of
credit growth variation, and NPLs shock explains about 40% of credit growth variation.
3.7 Conclusion
Oil price, Non-oil GDP, interest rate, stock prices, and housing prices are major determinants of
NPLs across GCC banks and therefore of financial stability in the region. The Credit risk shock
tends to propagate disturbance to Non-oil GDP, and credit growth across GCC economies. A
higher level of NPLs restricts banks’ credit growth and can dampen economic recovery in these
economies. These results support the notion that disturbances in banking systems lead to unwanted
economic consequences in the real sector. The results are qualitatively robust across different spec-
ifications. Counter cyclical policies that limit the GDP slowdown can promote financial stability
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across GCC region. Policy makers with financial stability objectives need to monitor the devel-
opments in international oil markets and smooth the potential spillover effects to GCC banking
systems. GCC countries implement fixed exchange rate regimes, and therefore exchange rates do
not impose serious credit risks in the region. The GCC economies, however, accumulated large
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1 17.683 82.316 0 0 0 
2 19.572 76.514 3.841 0.008 0.063 
3 19.662 73.801 5.558 0.1965 0.781 
4 18.992 71.975 6.929 0.361 1.740 
5 18.294 70.611 7.846 0.488 2.760 
6 17.722 69.608 8.477 0.561 3.630 
7 17.307 68.897 8.898 0.599 4.297 
8 17.023 68.405 9.180 0.615 4.774 
9 16.834 68.068 9.372 0.620 5.103 
10 16.708 67.833 9.507 0.621 5.329 
11 16.622 67.663 9.605 0.620 5.487 
12 16.561 67.536 9.681 0.618 5.602 
13 16.514 67.436 9.741 0.617 5.690 
14 16.476 67.354 9.790 0.617 5.760 
15 16.444 67.286 9.832 0.617 5.819 













1 61.290 0.802 37.906 0 0 
2 40.683 0.605 24.189 6.571 27.950 
3 38.172 0.606 23.391 6.058 31.771 
4 37.404 0.985 22.538 5.844 33.228 
5 37.233 1.762 22.239 5.838 32.926 
6 36.856 2.733 22.127 5.867 32.415 
7 36.341 3.692 22.030 5.867 32.068 
8 35.846 4.526 21.935 5.830 31.860 
9 35.458 5.211 21.841 5.779 31.709 
10 35.180 5.762 21.756 5.729 31.570 
11 34.986 6.210 21.681 5.687 31.433 
12 34.848 6.578 21.616 5.653 31.303 
13 34.742 6.889 21.559 5.624 31.183 
14 34.657 7.155 21.510 5.600 31.075 
15 34.584 7.38 21.468 5.580 30.980 













1 0.885 11.749 9.001 78.363 0 
2 0.726 12.0701 18.192 46.132 22.877 
3 0.713 11.661 18.519 33.545 35.559 
4 0.706 11.502 18.147 28.448 41.195 
5 0.686 11.512 17.826 26.525 43.449 
6 0.672 11.580 17.673 25.965 44.108 
7 0.675 11.636 17.621 25.881 44.185 
8 0.692 11.664 17.603 25.891 44.147 
9 0.715 11.677 17.591 25.891 44.123 
10 0.737 11.689 17.578 25.879 44.114 
11 0.755 11.706 17.568 25.866 44.103 
12 0.769 11.728 17.561 25.854 44.086 
13 0.779 11.753 17.557 25.843 44.066 
14 0.786 11.778 17.554 25.832 44.047 
15 0.792 11.802 17.552 25.821 44.031 
Table 3.6: The Forecast Error Variance Decomposition of Credit Growth in GCC Region
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES System GMM FE System GMM FE
NPL Growtht−1 0.817*** 0.701*** 0.814*** 0.691***
[0.0878] [0.0508] [0.0800] [0.0488]
Oil Pricet−1 -0.00512*** -0.00679*** -0.00458*** -0.00586***
[0.00187] [0.00139] [0.00165] [0.00145]
NOGDP RGrowtht−1 -0.00835* -0.0131*** -0.00708* -0.0103***
[0.00420] [0.00323] [0.00374] [0.00307]
Interest Ratet−1 0.0231** 0.0514** 0.0219** 0.0512**
[0.00866] [0.0201] [0.00901] [0.0195]
Credit Growtht−1 0.00111 -0.00245 0.00397 -0.00210
[0.00485] [0.00445] [0.00490] [0.00444]
StockPrice Growtht−1 -0.00389*** -0.00290*** -0.00397*** -0.00310***
[0.000800] [0.000806] [0.000785] [0.000808]
HousingPrices Growtht−1 -0.00860** -0.00756**
[0.00361] [0.00292]
Constant 0.156 0.214* 0.158 0.235*
[0.194] [0.124] [0.175] [0.123]
Observations 467 467 463 463
R-squared 0.601 0.600
Number of id 38 38 38 38
No. of instruments 33 34
Hansen test p-value 0.180 0.166
A-B AR(1) test p-value 0.000641 0.000601
A-B AR(2) test p-value 0.164 0.156
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1




VARIABLES System GMM FE
Logit NPLt−1 0.866*** 0.700***
[0.0782] [0.0486]
Oil Pricet−1 -0.00394** -0.00620***
[0.00176] [0.00154]
NOGDP RGrowtht−1 -0.00685* -0.0111***
[0.00369] [0.00325]
Interest Ratet−1 0.0135 0.0535**
[0.00818] [0.0202]
Credit Growtht−1 0.00350 -0.00152
[0.00380] [0.00454]
StockPrice Growtht−1 -0.00385*** -0.00325***
[0.000850] [0.000830]






Number of id 38 38
No. of instruments 34
Hansen test p-value 0.211
A-B AR(1) test p-value 0.00118
A-B AR(2) test p-value 0.140
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Econometric Results of Fixed Effect and System GMM Models - Logit transformation
of NPLs
Variable Definition Units Description Sources
NPL Non-performing Loans ratio Non-performing Loans ratio (Bank level) Fitch
Oil Price International Oil price U.S. Dollar Crude Oil Price IMF
Non-oil GDP Non-oil sector real GDP Non-oil sector Gross Domestic Product at 2005 prices National authorities; staff reports
Interest Rate The lending Rate % The lending Rate National authorities
Credit Growth Gross Loans U.S. Dollar 3-years Average of Total Gross Loans Fitch
Stock Prices Stock price index Index Average Stock market price index Bloomberg
Housing Prices Housing price index Index CPI components of Housing, water, electricity & other fuels National authorities
Table 3.9: Variable Description and Data Sources
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Country Category Name
Bahrain Commercial Bank Ahli United Bank BSC
Bahrain Commercial Bank Arab Banking Corporation
Bahrain Commercial Bank BBK B.S.C.
Bahrain Commercial Bank Gulf International Bank B.S.C.
Bahrain Commercial Bank National Bank of Bahrain
Kuwait Commercial Bank Ahli United Bank (Kuwait)
Kuwait Commercial Bank Commercial Bank of Kuwait
Kuwait Commercial Bank Gulf Bank
Kuwait Commercial Bank National Bank of Kuwait
Oman Commercial Bank Bank Dhofar S.A.O.G
Oman Commercial Bank Bank Muscat
Oman Commercial Bank HSBC Bank Oman SAOG
Oman Commercial Bank National Bank Of Oman
Oman Commercial Bank Oman Arab Bank SAOC
Qatar Commercial Bank Ahli Bank Q.S.C
Qatar Commercial Bank Commercial Bank of Qatar
Qatar Commercial Bank Doha Bank
Qatar Islamic Banks Qatar Islamic Bank
Qatar Commercial Bank Qatar National Bank
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Arab National Bank
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Bank Aljazira
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Banque Saudi Fransi
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank National Commercial Bank (The)
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Riyad Bank
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank SAMBA Financial Group
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Saudi British Bank
Saudi Arabia Commercial Bank Saudi Hollandi Bank
Saudi Arabia Investment Bank Saudi Investment Bank, The
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank Bank of Sharjah
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank Commercial Bank International
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank First Gulf Bank P.J.S.C.
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank Mashreqbank
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank National Bank Of Fujairah
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank National Bank Of Umm Al-Qaiwain
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank National Bank of Abu Dhabi PJSC
United Arab Emirates Commercial Bank Union National Bank
Table 3.10: List of the GCC Banks Sample - Fitch
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